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Abstract. The equilibria of strategic games with many semi-anonymous play-
ers have a strong ex-post Nash property. Even with perfect hindsight about
the realized types and selected actions of all his opponents, no player has an
incentive to revise his own chosen action. This is illustrated for normal form
and for one shot Baysian games with statistically independent types, provided
that a certain continuity condition holds.
Implications of this phenomenon include strong robustness properties of
such equilibria and strong puriﬁcation result for large anonymous games.
1. Introduction and Summary
In a one-shot game with many semi-anonymous players all the equilibria are
approximately ex-post Nash. Even with perfect hindsight about the realized types
and actions of all his opponents, no player regrets, or has an incentive to unilaterally
change his own selected action. This phenomenon holds for normal form games
and for one shot Bayesian games with statistically independent types, provided
that the payoﬀ functions are continuous. Moreover, the ex-post Nash property is
obtained uniformly, simultaneously for all the equilibria of all the games in certain
large classes, at an exponential rate in the number of players.
When restricted to normal form games, the above means that with probability
close to one, the play of any mixed strategy equilibrium must produce a vector of
pure strategies that is an epsilon equilibrium of the game. At an equilibrium of a
Bayesian game, the vector of realized pure actions must be an epsilon equilibrium
of the complete information game in which the realized vector of player types is
common knowledge. Before we elaborate on the implications of this phenomena, it
is helpful to view it in the context of the following example.
Simultaneously, each of two players has to choose computer I or M, and inde-
pendently of each other each has 2/3 probability of being an extrovert and 1/3
probability of being an introvert. The payoﬀ of an extrovert equals one if his
choice matches the opponent’s, zero otherwise, and for an introvert it is one if
he mismatches the opponent’s, zero otherwise. This game has two pure strategy
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equilibrium, introverts choose M and extroverts choose I and vice versa, and a con-
tinuum of mixed strategy equilibria
1. But non of these equilibria are ex-post Nash,
or even approximately so. Under any one of these equilibria, for example, there
is a signiﬁcant positive probability of ending up with two introverts who chose the
same computer, so that each one of then has the incentive to unilaterally change
his choice after observing the other.
When the number of players is large, however, all the Nash equilibria are approx-
imately ex-post Nash, even if the game is more complex and highly non symmetric.
The n-players simultaneous-move game may have more sophisticated types, and
players’ payoﬀs may depend on opponents types in addition to their chosen com-
puters (for example, a player may want to impress some opponents types with his
choice). Moreover, diﬀerent players may have (arbitrary) diﬀerent payoﬀ functions
and diﬀerent probability distributions by which their types are selected. Regard-
less of all such speciﬁcations, if conditions of semi anonymity and continuity hold,
it is almost certain that even with hindsight information about all the players re-
alized types and computer choices, no player would have a signiﬁcant incentive to
unilaterally change his own computer choice.
Going further, consider a family that contains, for every n=1,2,..., many possible
n-person games. If the games in the family satisfy semi anonymity and continuity
conditions then, uniformly at an exponential rate, all the equilibria of the games in
the family become ex-post Nash as we restrict attention to games with increasing
number of players.
The condition of semi anonymity requires that every player’s payoﬀ function,
which naturally may depend on his own type and action, depends on his opponents
only through proportions. What matters is the proportion (or the number) of the
opponents that fall into the various type and choice categories, and not the identity
of the players that make up these proportions
2.
The condition of continuity requires uniform equicontinuity of all payoﬀ functions
of games in the family. We discuss the signiﬁcance of this restriction in the main
body of the paper.
The obtained ex-post Nash property, discussed above, has important implica-
tions. First, it overcomes potential modelling pitfalls, see for example Cremer
and McLean (1985) and Green and Laﬀont (1987). Consider real life situations
in which players may revise earlier choices, for example when players rent, as op-
posed to buy, computers. A one-shot game model may produce equilibria that are
not sustainable in the real-life situation. With hindsight information about the
outcome of the one shot game, players who have better choices will simply revise,
and the actual ﬁnal outcome will be diﬀerent from the theoretically predicted one
3.
Having the ex-post Nash property means that we need not worry about this issue.
1F o re a c hp l a y e re a c ht y p ec a nm i xi na n yw a y ,p r o v i d e dt h a ti nt h ea g g r e g a t eo v e rt y p e sh e
is equaly likely to choose any one of the two computers.
2As we discuss in the paper, this is somewhat less restrictive than may appear, since information
about individual opponents can be incorporated into types.
3The standard game theory solution would require to write a more elaborate game that allow
for such revisons. This may be simple in some cases, but may be extremly diﬃcult in others.
Consider, for example, a two person match pennies game, in which the players are allowed to
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But going beyond revision possibilities, as reported in a companion paper, see
Kalai (2002), the ex-post Nash property obtained at an exponential rate here implies
that the equilibria must become extensively robust. They continue to be equilibria
even under major modiﬁcations of the game. Players order of moves may be
determined dynamically, as the game evolves, with information about types and
choices partially and discriminatingly revealed at intermediary stages, commitments
and revisions may be possible, cheap talk may take place and so on. Regardless of
all such modiﬁcations, the equilibria of the one shot game remain Nash equilibria
in all extensive modiﬁcations. This strong robustness property also implies that
the equilibria may play a role similar to that of rational expectations equilibria.
We can also view the obtained ex-post Nash phenomenon as a puriﬁcation result.
For example, when restricted to normal form games the ex-post Nash property
provides stronger conclusions than Schmeidler’s (1973) on the role of pure strategy
equilibria in large anonymous games. Working in the limit with a continuum
of players, Schmeidler shows that large anonymous games have pure strategy Nash
equilibria. The current paper shows, asymptotically, that in such games you cannot
get away from pure strategy Nash equilibria. The play of any mixed (and of
course pure) strategy equilibrium must produce proﬁles that are pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. So every mixed strategy may be thought of as a puriﬁcation device
4.
And extending this to Bayesian games, every equilibrium produces proﬁles with
actions that are pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the complete information game
determined by the proﬁle of realized types.
It is also interesting to connect the ﬁndings of this paper to learning in repeated
Bayesian games. A corollary in Kalai and Lehrer (1993) states that after playing
a Bayesian equilibrium of a repeated game for a long time players learn to play
optimally, as if they know the (unknown) realized types of their opponents. Or
alternatively, after playing for a long time no player has an incentive to deviate from
his ex-ante planned strategy, even if he acquires full knowledge of the realized types
of his opponents. In the current paper, players play optimally, as if they know the
realized types of their opponents, already in the ﬁrst (and the only) period. So in
the sense of Kalai and Lehrer, the players in the large game ”learned,” or rather
already know, the relevant information before they even begin playing.
This connection suggests interesting questions on how the number of players may
aﬀect the speed of learning in a repeated Bayesian games with semi-anonymous
players. On one hand, the larger the number of players the more there is to be
learned about opponents. On the other hand, as indicated by the current paper, the
larger the number of players the more predictable their aggregate behavior is. One
possible conclusion is that the hardest repeated games of incomplete information
to analyze are ones with an intermediate number of players.
Also related to Bayesian learning is the issue of learning the prior probabilities
by which types of players are generated. Following a standard Harsanyi setting the
results of this paper rely on the fact that these priors are known. But the strength
of the conclusion shows how strong this assumption is. Jackson and Kalai (1997)
oﬀer a model where priors are learned in a repeated play. Incorporating their
approach into a model with many players and learning is an interesting challenge.
4The existence of equilibrium is not an issue in the current model because we work with ﬁnite
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In proving the main result, we ﬁrst develop bounds on the level of the ex-post
Nash property that is attained at an arbitrary but ﬁxed Bayesian equilibrium in a
given game. To do so, we introduce a measure of strategic interdependence within a
subset of possible outcomes (realized vectors of types and actions). It measures how
ranking of alternatives by a player may be aﬀected by changes in the opponents
parameters within the set. Under low strategic interdependence, ex-post regret
must be low, as long as the play remains within the set. This means that we can
bound the level of the ex-post Nash property by identifying high probability sets
of outcomes in which the strategic interdependence is low.
Our continuity assumption guarantees that strategic interdependence must be
low when a set of outcomes is small. And for the case of many anonymous players,
laws of large numbers show that with high probability the game is likely to be
played in a small region near the expected play of an equilibrium. Put together,
these two phenomena describe the intuition behind the main result.
As the above discussion suggests, being ex-post Nash is really a local property.
So while the main theorem requires continuity of the payoﬀ functions on the entire
set of outcomes of the game, all that is really needed to make an equilibrium
highly ex-post Nash is a large number of anonymous players and continuity near
the expected play.
In an appendix, we discuss additional properties on the structure and stability
properties of ex-post Nash equilibria
Both, large games and ex-post Nash equilibrium are topics of increasing popu-
larity these days, the recent examples by Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000) and
Chung and Ely (2000) oﬀer additional references. An earlier version of this pa-
per, Kalai (2000), has further elaboration on the results reported here, as well as a
more substantial discussion of earlier related literature. We should point out that
Wooders,Cartwright and Selten (2002) oﬀer, for ”pregames” in a diﬀerent model,
a puriﬁcation result similar to the one discussed in Kalai (2000) and here.
2. General Definitions and Notations
Two ﬁnite universal sets, T and A, describe respectively all possible player types
and all possible player actions that appear in games discussed in this paper. For
notational eﬃciency, a universal set C ≡ T× Adenotes all possible player (type-
action) compositions.
A Bayesian game is described by a ﬁve-tuple (N,T,τ,A,u) as follows.
N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players.
T = ×iTi is the set of type proﬁles (or vectors), with each set Ti ⊆ T describing
the feasible types of player i .
τ =( τ1,τ2,...,τn) is the vector of prior probability distributions,w i t hτi(ti)
denoting the probability of player i being of type ti (τi(ti) ≥ 0 and
P
ti τi(ti)=1 ).
A = ×iAi is the set of action proﬁles,w i t he a c hs e tAi ⊆ A describing the
feasible actions of player i.
Let Ci ≡ Ti × Ai describe the feasible (type-action) compositions of player i,
and C = ×iCi denote the set of feasible composition proﬁles. Then, the players’
utility functions described by the vector u =( u1,u 2,...,un), assuming a suitable
normalization, are of the form ui : C → [0,1].
In addition, standard game theoretic conventions are used throughout the pa-
per. For example, for a vector x =( x1,x 2,...,xn) and an element x0
i, x−i =LARGE ANONYMOUS GAMES 5
(x1,...,xi−1,x i+1,...,xn) and (xi−1 : x0
i)=( x1,...,xi−1,x 0
i,x i+1,...,xn).A l s o ,
while a composition proﬁle c =( ( t1,a 1),...,(tn,a n)), we sometimes describe it as a
pair of proﬁles c =( t,a) in the obvious way.
The Bayesian game is played as follows. In an initial stage, independently of
each other, every player is selected to be of a certain type according to his prior
probability distribution. After being privately informed of his own type, every
player proceeds to select an action, possibly with the aid of a randomization devise.
Following this, the players are paid, according to their individual utility functions,
the payoﬀs computed at the realized proﬁle of (type-action) compositions.
Accordingly, a strategy of player i is deﬁned by a vector σi =( σi(ai | ti)) where
σi(ai | ti) describes the probability of player i choosing the action ai when he
is of type ti. Together with the prior distribution over his types, a strategy of
player i determines an individual distribution over player i’s compositions, γi(ci)=
τi(ti) × σi(ai | ti). The proﬁle of these distributions, γ =( γ1,γ2,...,γn), under
the independence assumption, determines the overall probability distribution over
outcomes of the game, namely composition proﬁles, by Pr(c)=
Q
i γi(ci).
Using expectation and with abuse of notations, the utility functions of the players
are extended to vectors of strategies by deﬁning ui(σ)=E(ui(c)).A s u s u a l , a
vector of strategies σ is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium if for every player i and every
one of his strategies σ0
i, ui(σ) ≥ ui(σ−i : σ0
i).
A composition proﬁle is ex-post Nash if with full knowledge of the proﬁle (types
and selected actions of all players) no player has the incentive to unilaterally change
his selected action. Alternatively, the vector of actions described by the proﬁle is
a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game determined by the proﬁle of
types. A strategy is ex-post Nash if it must lead to outcomes that have the above
stability property. Note that ex-post here is in a strong sense, since it requires that
the realized pure actions, not the mixed strategies, constitute a Nash equilibrium
of the complete information game with all the types being known.
Another way to interpret the property of being ex-post Nash is in terms of
decentralization of private information. When playing a strategy proﬁle with
this property, a player only has to know his own type in order to select his own
action. Any information about the realized types and selected actions of opponents
is irrelevant for the purpose of testing the optimality of his own selected action. In
other words, for the purpose of acting optimally, private information is important
but every player cares only about his own.
For proving asymptotic results a notion of approximate ex-post Nash is needed.
Deﬁnition 1. Approximate Ex-Post Nash:L e tε and ρ be positive numbers.
A composition proﬁle c is ε incentive compatible for player i if for every action
a0
i, ui(c−i :( ti,a 0
i)) ≤ ui(c)+ε.
A composition proﬁle is ε Nash if it is ε incentive compatible for every player.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle σ is (ε,ρ) ex-post Nash if the probability that it yields an ε
Nash composition proﬁle is at least 1 − ρ .
3. Ex-Post Nash Equilibria in Large Games
In addition to the universal sets of types and actions, T and A above, we as-
sume here that there is a universal set of possible payoﬀ functions U that consists
of functions of the form g : C×∆(C) −→ [0,1]. The interpretation is that the6 EHUD KALAI
ﬁrst argument in such a function is the player’s own composition and the second
argument is the empirical distribution of opponents’ compositions.
Moreover, we assume that the collection of functions U is uniformly equicontin-
uous. Recall that a collection of functions is such if for every positive ε there is
a positive δ such that for every two points x,y in the functions common domain
and for every function g in the collection |g(x) − g(y)| < ε whenever the distance
between x and y is less then δ. For example, every ﬁnite collection of continuous
functions deﬁned on the same compact domain is uniformly equicontinuous.
Deﬁnition 2. Empirical distribution: For every composition proﬁle c deﬁne
the empirical distribution induced by c on the universal set of compositions C by
empc(κ)=
(the number of coordinates i with ci = κ) /(the number of coordinates of c).
Deﬁnition 3. The family of semi-anonymous Bayesian games Γ = Γ(A,T ,U)
consist of all the Bayesian games (N,×Ti,τ,×Ai,(ui)) satisfying Ti ⊆ T , Ai ⊆
A, and where every ui can be imbedded in some function g ∈ U so that ui(c)=
g(ci,emp c−i).
Theorem 1. Ex-post Nash in Large Games: Given a family of semi-anonymous
Bayesian games Γ as above and a positive ε, there are positive constants A and B,
B<1, with the following property. Simultaneously, all the equilibria of games in
Γ with n or more players are (ε,ρn) ex-post Nash with ρn = ABn.
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to elaborate on the assumptions of
semi-anonymity and continuity.
The condition of semi anonymity is less restrictive than may appear, since it only
imposes anonymity within the payoﬀ functions but without further restrictions of
symmetry on the players. This means that information about named players can be
incorporated into their types. Consider for example a complete information normal
form game with n sellers, labeled 1,2,...,n and n buyers, labeled n+1,n+2,...,2n.
Suppose that the payoﬀ function of a seller depends on his own strategy and on
the empirical distribution of the strategies of the buyers. In violation of the
assumption of our model, the payoﬀ function of this seller does not treat all the
opponent anonymously, since the buyers, i.e., the players called n+1,...,2n, play a
role diﬀerent from the other players. But if within the buyer group all the players
are anonymous for this seller, then we can overcome this problem by describing the
situation by a semi anonymous Bayesian game as follows.
Allow each player to have two possible types, a seller or a buyer. Assign prob-
ability one of being a seller type to players 1,...,n, and a probability one of being
a buyer type to players n+1,...,2n. Now we can write the payoﬀ function of the
above seller in the obvious way to depend on the empirical distribution of types
(to depend only on the players that are of the buyer type) and actions, without
having to specify player labels. Clearly, this description is possible because the
model imposes no symmetry restriction on the prior distributions by which types
are drawn.
Similar to the above, the model can accommodate many non symmetric games.
In addition to playing diﬀerent roles, as above, players may be identiﬁed as belong-
i n gt od i ﬀerent geographical locations and to diﬀerent social or professional groups.LARGE ANONYMOUS GAMES 7
The assumption of ﬁnitely many types, however, does restrict the generality of such
descriptions.
The continuity assumption, when combined with the assumption of semi anonymity,
is more restrictive than may appear. Consider for example a game with n players,
each having to choose computer I or M. Player 1 is an expert, who is equally
likely to be a type who prefers I or a type who prefers M. His payoﬀ is 1 when he
chooses the computer that he prefers and 0 otherwise. All the other players are
of one possible type that prefers to match the choice of player 1, i.e., they are paid
1 when they match and 0 otherwise. As done above, we can describe this game
as a semi-anonymous Bayesian game with three types: an expert who prefers I, an
expert who prefers M, and a non expert. (Assign player 1 equal probability of
being one of the ﬁrst two types and to every other player probability one of being
of the third type.) In this game, player 1 choosing the computer he likes and every
other player randomizing with equal probability between the two computers is an
equilibrium of the one shot simultaneous move game.
Unlike the conclusion of the theorem, however, the above equilibrium is not
approximately ex-post Nash, no matter how large the number of buyers is. With
high probability close to a half of the players would want to revise their choices
once they observe the choice of the expert type. The diﬃculty is that the players
payoﬀ functions cannot be imbedded in a uniformly equicontinuous collection of
payoﬀ functions g as required by the theorem. As the number of players increases,
the percentage of expert types goes to zero. Any function g must specify payoﬀs
for compositions with zero proportions of experts. Yet arbitrarily close to such
compositions, there are outcomes with payoﬀ one and outcomes with payoﬀ zero.
4. Bounds on the Level of Ex-Post Nash of a Given Equilibrium
Every equilibrium is (ε,ρ) ex-post Nash for suﬃciently large ε and ρ.T h i s
section concentrates on a ﬁxed Nash equilibrium of a ﬁx e dB a y e s i a ng a m ea n d
develops bounds on the level of ex-post Nash stability it must have. These bounds
are used later to prove the main result. As it turns out, for an equilibrium to
be highly ex-post Nash, we do not need uniform continuity of the players’ payoﬀ
functions, continuity in a region of the likely outcomes is suﬃc i e n t . A n de v e nl e s s ,
the real property that is needed is low strategic interdependence in such a region.
Deﬁnition 4. Strategic Interdependence:
The strategic dependence of a player i in a set of composition proﬁles M, sdi(M),
is deﬁn e dt ob e
max|[ui(c1
−i :( ti,a 0
i)) − ui(c1
−i :( ti,a 00
i ))] − [ui(c2
−i :( ti,a 0
i)) − ui(c2
−i :( ti,a 00
i ))]|
with the maximum taken over all actions a0
i and a00
i ,a l lt y p e sti, and all composition
proﬁles c1,c 2²M with t1
i = t2
i = ti.
The strategic interdependence in M is deﬁned by si(M)=m a x i sdi(M)
The interpretation is that if sdi(M) is small and the composition proﬁles are
likely to be in M, then the gain to i in a switch from action a0
i to a00
i is almost
independent of his type and the compositions of the opponents. If this is the case,
any uncertainty about opponents types and actions plays only a little role in his
decision of what action to choose.8 EHUD KALAI
Lemma 1. A Bayesian equilibrium is (ε,ρ) ex-post Nash if for a set of composition
proﬁles M
ρ ≥ Pr(Mc) and ε ≥ si(M)+m a xP r ( Mc | ci)/pr(M | ci)
where the maximum is taken over all ci’s that are part of a composition proﬁle c²M.
Proof. Suﬃces to show that at any c²M, no player can improve his payoﬀ by more
than ε by switching from ai to another action. From the deﬁnition of strategic
interdependence, if switching at c, from ai to a0
i, improves player i’s payoﬀ by r,
t h e nt h es a m es w i t c hm u s ti m p r o v eh i sp a y o ﬀ by at least r − si(M) at any other
c²M with ti = ti (the improvement referred to is the following: ﬁx the opponents’
compositions and i’s type to be as in c, and consider the gain to his payoﬀ as he
switches from ai to a0
i). Thus, given his type ti and his selected action ai,p l a y e r
i can improve his expected payoﬀ by at least [r − si(M)]Pr(M | ci) − Pr(Mc | ci).
But since ai was selected to be an optimal response by i, the last expression must
be non-positive, which yields the desired bound. ¤
The above computational result illustrates that if σ generates a high probability
(in the conditional senses just described) low strategic-interdependence set M,t h e n
σ is highly ex-post Nash. The following discussion illustrates that under natural
restrictions on the game, and assuming a large number of players, such sets M are
natural.
Starting with a strategy proﬁle σ the induced vector of measures γ =( γ1,γ2,...,γn)
may be viewed as a vector of extended distributions, each being deﬁned over the
(same) universal set of all possible player compositions C (as opposed to each γi
being deﬁned on Ci ⊂ C). Simply, for any possible player composition κ ∈ C,
γi(κ)=γi(ci) if κ equals some ci ∈ Ci,a n dγi(κ)=0otherwise.
Deﬁnition 5. Expected distribution: For a vector of strategy proﬁle σ and
the induced distribution γ =( γ1,γ2,...,γn) deﬁne the expected distribution on the
universal set of compositions C to be the distribution expσ(κ)=
P
i γi(κ) / n
Recall also the deﬁnition of the Empirical Distribution: For every com-
position proﬁle c the empirical distribution induced by c on the universal set of
compositions C is empc(κ)=
(the number of coordinates i with ci = κ) /(the number of coordinates of c).
For a ﬁxed σ, the empirical distribution, being deﬁned for every randomly se-
lected c ∈ C, may be viewed as a |C| dimensional random variable. The expected
distribution on C, on the other hand, is a ﬁxed vector of |C| numbers. Coordi-
natewise, for every κ ∈ C, the expected value of the empirical distribution equals
the expected distribution at κ. By laws of large numbers one may expect with
high probability to obtain c’s whose empirical distribution is close to the expected
distribution.
Lemma 2. Chernoﬀ-Hoeﬀding additive bounds: Let X1,X 2,...,Xn be a
sequence of independent 0-1 random variables with Pr(Xi =1 )=µi. Let X = P
Xi/n and µ =
P
µi/n. Then for every δ > 0,
Pr(
¯ ¯X − µ
¯ ¯ > δ) ≤ 2e−2δ2n.
Proof. See Theorem A.4 in Alon, Spencer and Erdos (1992) page 235. Apply it
once to the variables Xi − µi and once to their negatives. ¤LARGE ANONYMOUS GAMES 9
Lemma 3. Let X1,X 2,...,Xn be a sequence of independent 0-1 random variables
with Pr(Xi =1 )=µi. Let X =
P
Xi/n and µ =
P
µi/n. Then for every δ > 0
and every i,
Pr(
¯ ¯X − µ
¯ ¯ > δ | Xi) ≤ 2e−2[(nδ−1)/(n−1)]
2(n−1).
Proof. Let X−i =
P
j6=i Xj/(n − 1) and µ−i =
P
j6=i µj/(n − 1). ¯ ¯X − µ
¯ ¯ > δ implies that
¯ ¯X−i − µ−i
¯ ¯ > δn/(n−1)−1/(n−1) = (nδ−1)/(n−1).
The lemma follows by applying the previous lemma to X−i. ¤
Deﬁne the δ neighborhood of expσ by
nbd(expσ,δ)={c ∈ C :m a x
κ |empc(κ) − expσ(κ)| ≤ δ}.
Lemma 4. For any δ > 0, Pr[c/ ∈ nbd(expσ,δ)] ≤ 2|C|e−2δ2n.
So for any given small δ and the ﬁxed cardinality |C| of the universal set of com-
positions, if the number of players is large there is a high probability of the empirical
distribution of compositions being uniformly close to the expected distribution of
compositions. Moreover, the same holds true for the conditional probabilities.
Lemma 5. For any δ > 0, Pr[c/ ∈ nbd(expσ,δ)|ci] ≤ 2|C|e−2[(nδ−1)/(n−1)]2(n−1).
Applying the previous general bounds on the level of ex-post Nash to M =
nbd(expσ,δ), one obtains the following bounds.
Theorem 2. Bounds on the Level of Ex-Post Nash:F o ra n yδ > 0 aB a y e s i a n
equilibrium σ is (ε,ρ) ex-post Nash if
ε >s i [nbd(expσ,δ)]
+2|C|e−2[(nδ−1)/(n−1)]2(n−1)/[1 − 2|C|e−2[(nδ−1)/(n−1)]2(n−1)],a n d
ρ > 2|C|e−2δ2n.
5. P r o o fo ft h eM a i nR e s u l t
We ﬁx the family of semi-anonymous games Γ, with a collection of uniformly
equicontinuous payoﬀ functions U as in the statement of the theorem. It is suﬃcient
to prove the theorem for some positive integer m. That is, given the family and a
positive ε there is an m and constants A and B, with the conclusion of the theorem
holding for all n ≥ m. This is so because once you prove it for some m you can
simply increase A to an A0, so that the conclusion, with A0 and B, is trivially
satisﬁed for all values of n ≤ m (make A0Bm > 1), and the statement for n>mis
unchanged.
Lemma 6. uniform equicontinuity implies low local strategic interdepen-
dence: For any positive ε there is a positive δ with the following property. For
every game in the family and for every strategy proﬁle σ, ε >s i [nbd(expσ,δ)].
Proof. Recall that si[nbd(expσ,δ)] is deﬁned to be the maximum of the expression
below, when you consider all players i, all pairs of actions a0
i and a00
i ,a l lt y p e sti,
and all pairs of composition proﬁles c1,c 2²nbd(expσ,δ) having t1 = t2 = ti:
|[ui(c1
−i :( ti,a 0
i)) − ui(c1
−i :( ti,a 00
i ))] − [ui(c2
−i :( ti,a 0
i)) − ui(c2
−i :( ti,a 00
i ))]|
But rearranging terms this expression equals
|[ui(c1
−i :( ti,a 0
i)) − ui(c2
−i :( ti,a 0
i))] − [ui(c1
−i :( ti,a 00
i )) − ui(c2
−i :( ti,a 00
i ))]|10 EHUD KALAI
This last expression can be made arbitrarily small by making each of its two terms




−i :( ti,a 0
i)) can be made arbitrarily small by restricting attention
to c’s in nbd(expσ,δ). However, the equicontinuity assures us that by making δ
suﬃciently small, we can make these expressions small, simultaneously, for all the
strategy proﬁles of all the games in Γ. ¤
Back to the proof of the theorem, recall from the previous section, that an
equilibrium σ is (ε,ρ) ex-post Nash if for some δ > 0 the following two inequalities
are satisﬁed.
ε >s i [nbd(expσ,δ)] + 2|C|e−2[(nδ−1)/(n−1)]2(n−1)/[1 − 2|C|e−2[(nδ−1)/(n−1)]2(n−1)]
and
ρ > 2|C|e−2δ2n.
Using the lemma above, we can choose a positive δ and an m suﬃciently large so
that the top inequality holds simultaneously for all strategy proﬁles σ of all the
games with m or more players. Simply choose δ to make the ﬁrst expression in
the right hand side smaller than ε/2 and m suﬃciently large to make the second
expression smaller than ε/2.
The proof is now completed by setting A =2|C| and B = e−2δ2
.
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7. Appendix: Further Properties of Ex-Post Nash Equilibria
We ﬁrst discuss some properties of (full) ex-post Nash equilibrium, before com-
menting on the possible extensions of these properties to approximate ex-post Nash
equilibrium.
7.1. Structure.
.34 .60 .06 0 0
.27 6,75 ,77 ,7 1,21 ,3
.38 6,55 ,57 ,5 9,25 ,1
.35 6,85 ,87 ,8 5,44 ,3
02 ,22 ,40 ,19 ,87 ,7
03 ,71 ,91 ,91 ,19 ,9
As already stated, in normal form games every pure strategy equilibrium is
ex-post Nash. The payoﬀ table above oﬀers a typical example of ex-post Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Since every one of the nine balded entries is a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and since these are the support of the indicated
mixed strategy proﬁle, it is clear that the mixed strategy equilibrium is ex-post
Nash.
Several additional properties must hold. Recall ﬁrst the notion of Nash inter-
changeability for strategies of normal form games. Two equilibria a =( a1,...,an)
and b =( b1,...,bn) are interchangeable, see Luce and Raiﬀa (1957), if every strategy
proﬁle m =( m1,...,mn) which is a coordinatewise selection from a and b, i.e. every
mi = ai or bi, is also a Nash equilibrium. This property guarantees that for the
sake of choosing his own best reply a player is not concerned with which equilibrium
a or b is the one being played. A best reply in one is automatically a best reply
to the other and to any coordinatewise selection from the two. Since the support
of a mixed strategy equilibrium has a product structure it must be that a proﬁle
of strategies is an ex-post Nash equilibrium if and only if its support consists of
interchangeable Nash equilibria.
This observation generalizes to Bayesian equilibria with independent types. Con-
sider a set of Nash composition proﬁles S, and recall that every one of its elements
c =( c1,...,cn) c a nb ev i e w e da sap a i ro fo r d e r e dp r o ﬁles (t,a) describing respec-
tively the types and actions of the n players. Deﬁne the elements of S to be
interchangeable if every coordinatewise selection of such elements m, i.e., every
mi = ci for some c ∈ S, is Nash (recall this means that m =( t,a) with a being
a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game induced by t). Similar to
the case of normal form games, interchangeability in a Bayesian game means that
a player is not concerned with which outcome in the set S prevails. If the player is
of type ti and chooses ai as best response to some opponents’ composition proﬁle
in an interchangeable S, then this choice is automatically best responding to any
other opponents’ composition proﬁle from S.
Proposition 1. Interchangeability.A s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle of a Bayesian game is
ex-post Nash if and only if its support consists of Nash composition proﬁles that are
interchangeable.12 EHUD KALAI
Proof. This follows from the fact that both the strategies and the prior over types
have a product structure (the latter under the independence assumption made
throughout this paper). ¤
A mixed strategy ex-post Nash equilibrium may also be thought of as having
weak version of strategic dominance property. Note that any one of the strategies
in the support of the row chooser above, i.e. rows 1-3, is weakly dominant if you
restrict the column chooser to strategies in her support, i.e., columns 1-3. Similar
dominance holds for strategies of the column chooser when you restrict the row
chooser to his equilibrium strategies. This is also true at Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Restricted Dominance. For every ci =( ti,a i) which is a
coordinate of a composition proﬁle c in the support of an ex-post Nash equilibrium,
ai must be a dominant strategy for type ti,a so n er e s t r i c tt h eo u t c o m e so ft h eg a m e
to have any c0
−i from the support of the other players’ equilibrium distribution.
The structure described above shows that being ex-post Nash implies ex-ante
Nash.
Proposition 3. Ex-Post implies Ex-Ante Nash.I f a s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle is ex-post
Nash it must be a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. A Bayesian equilibrium may be characterized by having every player i using
actions ai that have highest expected value relative to every one of his realized
types ti. The structural propositions above guarantee that player i does so at
every strategy proﬁle that is ex-post Nash. ¤
7.2. Robustness and Stability. While ex-post Nash means stability with perfect
hindsight knowledge, it implies stability with partial hindsight knowledge. For-
mally, let a signalling function be any g : C → M,w h e r eC is the set of composition
proﬁles and M is an abstract set of messages. The Bayesian equilibrium σ is (i,g)
ex-post Nash if for every positive probability composition proﬁle c, conditioning on
the information g(c) with the knowledge of his own type ti and selected action ai,
player i cannot improve his expected utility by switching to a diﬀerent action a0
i.
Proposition 4. Invariance to Ex-Post Partial Information: An ex-post
Nash equilibria is (i,g) ex-post Nash for every player i and every signalling function
g.
Proof. Given any outcome c a n da na c t i o na0
i diﬀerent from ai, consider all the pos-
itive probability outcomes c that are compatible with player i’s information ti,a i,
and g(c), i.e., the outcomes that i cannot diﬀerentiate among with the knowledge
that he has at c. Being ex-post Nash implies that switching at any such c from ai
to a0
i can only decrease player i’s payoﬀ. Thus his conditional expected gain from
the switch could only be negative. ¤
Ex-post Nash equilibria are stable under changes in the prior distributions over
types, and in the probabilities of mixed strategies of the opponents. Formally,
given a Bayesian game G =( N,T,τ,A,u), a game G0 =( N,T,τ0,A,u) has modiﬁed
priors that admit no new types if for every type proﬁle t, τ0(t) > 0 implies that
τ(t) > 0.
Proposition 5. Invariance to Prior Type Probabilities: If σ is an ex-post
Nash equilibrium in a game G then it is also an ex-post Nash equilibrium in every
game G0 with modiﬁed priors that admit no new types.LARGE ANONYMOUS GAMES 13
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that any positive probability com-
position proﬁle generated by σ in G0 has positive probability of being generated in
G, and thus it is a Nash proﬁle. ¤
For exactly the same reasons the following is also true. Given any equilibrium
σ of G,amodiﬁed strategy proﬁle that admits no new actions is a strategy proﬁle
σ0, with the property that for every player i and type ti, σ0
i(ai|ti) > 0 implies that
σi(ai|ti) > 0.
Proposition 6. Invariance to Mixing Probabilities: If an equilibrium is ex-
post Nash then every modiﬁed strategy proﬁle that admits no new actions is also
ex-post Nash.
The above two propositions illustrate that in playing or in analyzing a simul-
taneous move Bayesian game, at an ex-post Nash equilibrium one should only be
concerned with the type proﬁles that may be generated by nature, and not with
their probabilities, and with the actions that may be selected by the players, but
not with the probabilities used to select them.
Turning our attention to approximate ex-post Nash, some of the above proper-
ties should generalize to their approximate versions in a straight forward fashion.
These include interchangeability, restricted dominance, ex-post implies ex-ante, and
invariance with partial information. The invariance to prior probability and to mix-
ing probabilities does not hold for approximate ex-post Nash. But it does have
implications for continuity properties of such equilibria.
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